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Abstract 
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on 
the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable
and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against 
the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques,
namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme,
independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system’s
unconditional security. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Unconditional security means that, even in the case of a perfectly able eavesdropper (Eve), 
the perfect security limit (zero information for Eve) of communication can be approached if 
sufficient resources (time, etc.) are available [1]. Unconditional security is essential in 
intelligent vehicle systems [2,3]; for power and sensor networks of strategical importance 
[4,5]; for ultra-strong PUF hardware keys [6]; and in secure computer, instrument and video 
game systems [7]. 
Currently, the only unconditionally secure key exchange that can be integrated on a chip 
and has reasonable price is the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) scheme, which 
was first introduced in 2005 [8-11]. It is the only classical physical competitor of quantum 
communicators [1]. Its security is based on the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem [9] of 
classical statistical physics and the properties of Gaussian stochastic processes [12]. There 
have been various valid attacks causing minor information leak but not a full crack, such as 
methods using the cable capacitance [13], cable resistance (Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv attack) 
[14-18], temperature-inaccuracy (Hao-attack) [19-21]. However, in each case, the information 
leak can be eliminated whenever sufficient resources (either specific hardware, higher 
accuracy, or enough time for privacy amplification) are available, thus the system stays 
unconditionally secure [1].  
Some other attacks are simply invalid with fundamental flaws in their model and physics. 
Yet the analysis of these faulty attempts in the subsequent rebuttals [23-25,28,30] provides 
deeper understanding of the security of the KLJN scheme. Perhaps the best example is the 
Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) "directional coupler" attack published in one of the Nature 
journals [22], where serious conceptual and theoretical errors [23-25] incorrectly imply that a 
directional coupler can be built and that will serve with information leak. However, 
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directional coupler cannot be built for the KLJN's no-wave (quasi static) situation [28], 
moreover, even an existing directional coupler would be insufficient to extract any 
information in the steady state [23-25]. Interestingly, perhaps as the result of wishful thinking, 
the mistakes mentioned above were "verified" by experiments with severe flaws in [22], 
where even the KLJN loop was broken into two coupled Kirchhoff loops by a shunt resistor a 
the middle, see the rebuttal in [26]. Two coupled Kirchhoff loops have never been claimed 
secure and they obviously represent a giant information leak. Actually, any deviation from the 
original single KLJN loop implies information leak, which sometimes can be eliminated by 
introducing proper modifications, see [18].  
Another one, a high-profile, many-sided cracking attempt by Bennett-Riedel [27], while it 
triggered useful and extensive analysis in a rebuttal [28], it has also failed with all of its goals, 
further indicating that physical security is a subtle topic. Here we also mention an earlier 
unsuccessful attempt [29], which, similarly to the above ones, triggered discussions [30] with 
valuable outcomes. Finally, we acknowledge a recent transient attack by GAA [31], which is 
valid, even though there are severe mistakes [44] in the considerations about security and 
physics in the Appendix of the paper, and a simple, known solution [32] does exist to fully 
eliminate this attack.  
In conclusion, the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme remains unchallenged. As 
with the evolution of quantum communicators, further attacks schemes are expected to 
emerge and to trigger new defense solutions that eliminate those attacks, too.  
The core KLJN secure key exchange system [1,9-11,32-40] is shown in Fig. 1, while [2-7] 
and [41-43] are dealing with advanced aspects with expansions and applications. At the 
beginning of each bit exchange period (BEP), Alice and Bob randomly select a resistor from 
the set RL, RH  , RL  RH , where LR represents the Low bit value (L) and HR  the High bit 
value (H), and they connect the chosen resistors to the wire channel (cable). The Gaussian 
voltage noise generators emulates the Johnson noise of the resistors and deliver band-limited 
white noise with publicly agreed bandwidth and temperature Teff . Within each BEP, Alice and 
Bob measure the current and voltage noises, Ich (t)  and Uch (t) , in the cable. Using the 
Johnson formula, they derive the unknown resistance value at the other end of the cable which 
is the difference between their own resistance and the total loop resistance [9]. Though Eve 
can also obtain the total loop resistance, she cannot distinguish the LH and HL bit situations, 
which indicates a secure bit exchange. The HH and LL bit situations are disregarded. 
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Fig. 1. Schematics of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. 
The resistor values are LR  and HR . The thermal noise voltages,  LU t  and  HU t , are generated 
at an effective temperature effT . The channel noise voltage and current are  chU t  and  chI t , 
respectively. 
 
2. Current Injection Attack 
 
The current injection attack is an active (invasive) attack, which was introduced in 2006 
[9]. Its security analysis was given in 2013 [28] but the attack itself had never been practically 
tested.  
 
2.1. The Attack Protocol 
 
For the sake of simplicity but without losing generality, fixed LH bit arrangement with 
RL  RH  is assumed. During the exchange of the bit, Eve attempts to identify the location of 
LR  and HR  by injecting a Gaussian current Iinj t   of the same bandwidth as the channel 
noises into the cable while she measures the following cross-correlations during the exchange 
of the i-th key bit: 
 
ia  Iinj t  Icha t    ,    (1) 
  
ib  Iinj t  Ichb t   ,    (2)
 
where  chaI t  and  chbI t  are the channel currents at Alice’s and Bob’s ends, respectively, see 
Fig. 2. The time average τ  is taken over the bit exchange period  . According to the 
current divider rule, a greater current flows to the direction of the lower resistance. With Alice 
connecting to LR and Bob connecting to HR , the cross-correlation ia  at Alice’s side is greater 
than the cross-correlation ib  at Bob’s side. For N bits, Eve calculates 
i  ia  ib   (i  1,..., N )   and decides as follows: 
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If   i  0    then  LH   (Eve guessed the bit correctly),  set  qi  1 .   (3) 
  
   If   i  0    then  HL   (Eve guessed the bit incorrectly),  set  qi  0 .        (4)
 
When N  approaches infinity, the probability pE  of Eve’s successful guessing of the bits 
converges to the expected value of q  and 
 
qi N  pE where E0.5 1p  .    (5)
 
The case E 0.5p  , indicates perfect security, that is, Eve’s information is zero (equivalent 
to guessing the key bits by tossing an unbiased random coin [43]).  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Current injection attack against the ideal KLJN system [2].  injI t  is injection current. 
 chaI t ,  chbI t ,  chaU t  and  chbU t  are the channel currents/voltages at Alice’s and Bob’s ends 
respectively. (Note, the positive current directions at the two ends are chosen to follow the 
directions of the components of Eve's injected positive current). 
 
 
2.2. Generic Defense Protocol 
 
To provide security against the current injection attack, Alice and Bob can act similarly as 
against any active (invasive) attacks by measuring the instantaneous voltage and current 
amplitudes at their ends and compare them via public authenticated data exchange [1,10], see 
Fig. 3. In the case of deviance, Alice and Bob discard the bit or use a more advanced security 
protocol [1].  
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Fig. 3. The defense against the current injection attack. 
 
 
3. Simulation Results 
 
We used the RG58 coaxial cable model from the library of the cable and circuit simulator 
LTSPICE (Linear Technology), to test both the ideal and a practical KLJN system. We 
assumed that Alice and Bob selected L 1 kR    and H 9 kR   , respectively; the bit 
exchange period   was 0.1 s; N=10000; 16eff 7.25 10 KT   ; and the bandwidth of the 
Gaussian noises 250 Hz. 
We tested three levels of the injected Gaussian current noise, i.e., 0.1%, 1% and 10% of the 
rms channel current, in four different versions of the KLJN system (see Fig. 4). At each 
scenario, Eve’s probability of guessing the bits was calculated, see Table 1.  
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Fig. 4. The four different versions of KLJN system under the current injection attack. (a) the ideal 
KLJN system; (b) the practical KLJN system with 100 m cable; (c) the practical KLJN system 
with 1000 m cable; (d) the practical KLJN system with 1000 m cable and capacitor killer (ideal 
unity-gain voltage buffer) [13]. cI  is capacitive current from the inner conductor to the outer 
shield of the cable. The cable is RG58 coaxial cable. 
 
At 0.1% injected current level, in the ideal KLJN system, pE  was 0.503, which is near to 
ideal. At 1% and 10% the information leak progressively increased with higher pE  values 
(0.513 and 0.613). Eve’s success probability values in the practical cable-based systems were 
very similar, see Table 1. Injecting even higher levels of current is also possible but that 
makes the detection of eavesdropping easier.  
Table 1. Eve’s success probability pE with 10000 bits key length.  
Injection current 
(in % of the rms channel current) 
0.1% 1% 10% 
Ideal cable 0.503 0.513 0.613 
100 meters cable 0.503 0.513 0.613 
1000 meters cable 0.501 0.510 0.608 
1000 meters cable with capacitor killer 0.503 0.513 0.613 
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4. Simulation Result of the Defense Methods 
 
4.1. The defense protocols 
 
As mentioned above, in the ideal KLJN system, Alice and Bob can easily discover the 
current injection attack by comparing the instantaneous current data [9]. If the currents are 
different, Alice and Bob can discard the bit.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Instantaneous voltage and current comparison against current injection attack in the ideal 
KLJN system. (a) No attack. (b) Under current injection attack. 
 
However, in practical systems, the currents are slightly different due to the cable's 
capacitive current leak. Then Alice and Bob must also monitor and exchange the 
instantaneous voltage data, too. Then, they input the voltage data into the accurate cable 
model and compare the simulated currents  *chaI t  and  *chbI t  with the corresponding 
measured currents  chaI t  and Ichb t  , see Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 6. The instantaneous voltage and current comparison against current injection attack in 
practical KLJN system: (a) No current injection attack, (b) Under current injection attack.  *chaI t  
and  *chbI t  are the simulated currents at Alice’s and Bob’s side respectively.  cI t  is the leakage 
current through the cable parasitic capacitance. 
 
If the measured and the simulated currents are the same,  
 
   *cha cha 0I t I t  ,    (6) 
  
   *chb chb 0I t I t  ,    (7)
 
then the bit exchange is secure. If the currents are different, an attack may take place. If the 
difference is greater than a pre-agreed threshold value, Alice and Bob discard the bit. 
The simulated comparison results at Alice’s side are shown in Fig. 7. The solid line 
indicates a current injection attack and the  chaI t -  *chaI t  difference is well visible. Alice and 
Bob can recognize the attack virtually immediately. The dashed line shows the secure 
situation with  chaI t =  *chaI t . 
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Fig. 7. Demonstration of the efficiency of the defense protocol with the practical cable over the bit 
exchange period. Alice and Bob can recognize the attack virtually immediately. The cable length 
is 1000 m. 
 
4.2. Privacy Amplification 
 
Privacy amplification is a well-known method that can be used to reduce any type of 
information leak [43]. The KLJN system can reach extraordinarily low bit error probability 
[38-40] thus privacy amplification (which is basically an error enhancer) can be efficiently be 
used. The simplest technique is the XOR-ing of the subsequent pairs of the key bits, that is, 
generating a new key which is cleaner and have half of the length of the original key. We 
simulated the effect of this technique at the most effective attack scenario, see Table 1. The 
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simulation results showed that by XOR-ing once, Eve’s success probability was reduced from 
0.613 to 0.530, which was further reduced to 0.502 by XOR-ing the second time. The 
resulting key length became one quarter of its original length with significantly higher 
security.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we validated the current injection attack against both the ideal and the 
practical KLJN system by utilizing LTSPICE. We have shown that the current and voltage 
comparison method, combined by in-site cable simulations, can efficiently detect and 
eliminate the attack. 
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